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ABSTRACT
In this study, we analyze the role of various categories of
subsidiary information in conducting replay attack spoofing
detection: ‘Room Size’, ‘Reverberation’, ‘Speaker-to-ASV
distance, ‘Attacker-to-Speaker distance’, and ‘Replay Device
Quality’. As a means of analyzing subsidiary information, we
use two frameworks to either subtract or include a category of
subsidiary information to the code extracted from a deep neu-
ral network. For subtraction, we utilize an adversarial process
framework which makes the code orthogonal to the basis vec-
tors of the subsidiary information. For addition, we utilize
the multi-task learning framework to include subsidiary in-
formation to the code. All experiments are conducted using
the ASVspoof 2019 physical access scenario with the pro-
vided meta data. Through the analysis of the result of the
two approaches, we conclude that various categories of sub-
sidiary information does not reside enough in the code when
the deep neural network is trained for binary classification.
Explicitly including various categories of subsidiary informa-
tion through the multi-task learning framework can help im-
prove performance in closed set condition.
Index Terms— Subsidiary information, replay attack,
spoofing detection, cosine adversarial network, multi-task
learning
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, advances in automatic speaker recognition
have made audio spoofing attacks possible and created a
need for countermeasures to prevent such attacks [1–9].
The ASVspoof challenges are providing a common plat-
form for researchers to verify and compare various ap-
proaches [10–12]. Among such challenges, the 2019 chal-
lenge provides two scenarios for the countermeasures against
audio spoofing attacks with controlled configurations for re-
search: the logical and physical access (PA) scenarios. In this
study, we concentrate on the physical scenario, which is also
referred to as replay attack detection. The task is a binary
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classification problem where an input audio is classified into
either bona-fide (also called genuine) or spoofed (replayed).
Recently, deep neural networks (DNNs) have displayed
promising performances across a range of academic and
industrial tasks, including the image and audio domains
[13,14]. One of the research objective of DNN-related studies
is to train DNN as a feature extractor, where a N-dimensional
representation vector from the last hidden layer is used as
the feature for the target task (i.e. d-vector/x-vector speaker
embeddings for speaker recognition, referred to as ‘code’
throughout this paper) [1, 15–17]. Regarding this research
objective, a number of studies are devising techniques to ei-
ther subtract certain information from or incorporate it in the
representation vector [18, 19]. For example, Heo et al. [18]
devised an adversarial scheme called cosine adversarial net-
work (CAN) to train the code to become orthogonal to the
basis vectors of the subsidiary information which is known
to be an obstacle for the target task. As an another example,
Chen et al. [20] used a multi-task learning (MTL) frame-
work [19] to incorporate phoneme information to the code
for the speaker verification task with the hypothesis that the
code which also includes phoneme information would better
represent the input utterance.
In this study, we further analyze the role of various cat-
egories of subsidiary information in replay attack spoofing
detection. Specifically, we determine whether each category
of subsidiary information is beneficial for spoofing detection
by observing the loss and equal error rates (EERs) when
each category of subsidiary information is either removed
or added. For this goal, we use two frameworks introduced
in the previous paragraph: CAN for subtracting and MTL
for adding various categories of subsidiary information. We
analyze all five categories of subsidiary information (‘Room
Size’, ‘Reverberation’, ‘Speaker-to-ASV distance’, ‘Attacker-
to-Speaker distance’, and ‘Replay Device Quality’) provided
in the ASVspoof 2019 PA scenario dataset.
Our study differs from the conventional studies that deal
with subsidiary information in the following two ways [21–
23]. First, we analyzed the individual effects of each category
of subsidiary information separately, while previous studies
merely included combinations of different categories of sub-
sidiary information to the code. Second, we analyzed the
role of each subsidiary information in more detail, whether
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Table 1: Architecture of the E2E DNN. Each number in ‘Out-
put shape’ refers to frame (time), frequency, and the number
of filters respectively. The number 120 of ‘Input’ is only for
training phase for mini-batch construction. At test phase, ut-
terance with varying duration is input to the model. All con-
volutional layers have filter length of 3 for frame and 7 for fre-
quency dimension. Three numbers inside the bracket of con-
volutional layers refer to stride size in frame and frequency
dimension and the number of filters. Batch normalization and
the first activation is omitted at the first residual block follow-
ing [24].
Layer Input:(120, 1025) Output shape
Conv1
Conv(3,3,128)
(120, 1025, 16)BN
LReLU
Res block

BN
LReLU
Conv(2, 4, 128)
BN
LReLU
Conv(2, 4, 128)

×9 (15, 17, 128)
AvgPool Pool(1, 17) (15, 128)
GRU GRU(512) (512,)
Code FC(64) (64,)
Output FC(2) (2,)
such subsidiary information is required for conducting replay
spoofing detection. We did this by including and by trying to
exclude it from the code.
Through the analysis regarding the role of various cate-
gories of subsidiary information we show that all five cate-
gories of subsidiary information does not reside in the code
of the conventional systems enough through experiments that
subsidiary information classification cannot be conducted us-
ing the code, trained for replay attack detection in a in binary
classification task (bona-fide/spoofed). By including various
categories of subsidiary information to the code, we found
performance improvements in replay spoofing detection in
closed set condition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the baseline end-to-end (E2E) DNN model used
for replay attack spoofing detection. The two frameworks, for
subtracting and adding a category of subsidiary information,
are addressed in Section 3. The experiments and result anal-
ysis are presented in Section 4 and 5 respectively. The paper
is concluded in Section 6.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: Simplified architecture of the E2E DNN, CAN, and
MTL. In the CAN framework, code is trained to become or-
thogonal to basis vectors of the subsidiary model by the ad-
versarial process. In the MTL framework, code is trained to
include both information regarding the primary model and the
subsidiary model. (a) E2E DNN described in Table 1 is inter-
preted as a combination of encoder and primary model. (b)
Architecture of CAN and MTL. For CAN, subsidiary model
comprises 2 more hidden layers and an output layer following
that of [18]. For MTL, subsidiary model comprises only the
output layer.
2. END-TO-END DNN BASELINE
2.1. Model architecture
End-to-end (E2E) DNN is a promising architecture for vari-
ous tasks [2, 25, 26]. It incorporates both feature extraction
and classification into a single DNN to fully exploit the merit
of a data-driven training scheme. In this study, we use the
E2E DNN of [27] which showed promising performance at
the ASVspoof 2019 PA challenge despite its simple process
pipeline 1.
Table 1 describes the E2E DNN architecture used in this
study. This network takes spectrograms as input, and outputs
the result of replay attack detection using an output layer
with two nodes indicating bona-fide and spoofed, respec-
tively. We used residual blocks that comprise convolutional
layers, batch normalization layers [28], and leaky rectified
linear unit (LReLU) activation functions [29] following the
identity mapping [24] of He et al. used to extract multi-
ple segment-level embeddings from an input spectrogram.
Then, the frequency axis is averaged using an average pool-
ing layer. A gated recurrent unit (GRU) layer then extracts
an utterance-level embedding followed by a fully-connected
layer (the code).
2.2. Ring loss
A number of loss functions are being studied to supplement
the softmax output [30,31]. Among these loss functions, Ring
1A Github link with the full code of our implementation of the model will
be released after the anonymity period ends
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Three phases for the training of CAN framework. These phases are repeated, starting from (a). (a) The encoder and
the primary model are trained, equivalent to E2E DNN model training. (b) The encoder and the primary model are frozen, and
the subsidiary model is trained. The amount of subsidiary information that resides in the current encoder is evaluated. (c) Both
primary and subsidiary models are frozen, and the encoder is trained. Here, the encoder is trained to produce the code that is
orthogonal to the basis vectors of the subsidiary model.
loss [31], which was first proposed for the face recognition
task, has been showing promising results. Ring loss normal-
izes the code (from the last hidden layer) to a learnt value R
by penalizing how far the norm of the code is from the current
R. Ring loss can be defined by:
LR = λ
2m
∑
(||F(xi)||2 −R)2, (1)
where λ refers to the weight of the Ring loss (weight of CCE
loss is assumed to be 1), m refers to the mini-batch size, R
refers to the radius of the ring (norm value) and F(xi) is the
code. In this study, we compare experimental results of both
with and without Ring loss (see Section 5).
3. FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLOITING
SUBSIDIARY INFORMATION
In this section, we introduce two frameworks for subtracting
and adding a certain category of subsidiary information: co-
sine adversarial network (CAN) [18] and multi-task learning
(MTL) [19]. To introduce both frameworks, we reinterpret the
E2E DNN as illustrated in Figure 1. In this point of view, the
E2E DNN explained in the previous section is interpreted as
a combination of an ‘encoder’ which extracts the code from
spectrogram and a ‘primary’ model which conducts binary
classification using the code.
3.1. Cosine Adversarial Network
Cosine adversarial network (CAN) was proposed to eliminate
subsidiary information from the code extracted by an encoder
[18]. By eliminating subsidiary information that is known
to decrease the performance of the target task, improvements
in performance have been observed. For example, improved
performance was shown by removing the channel information
in the speaker verification.
In this study, we use the CAN framework to examine
whether various categories of subsidiary information are in-
cluded in the code for conducting replay spoofing attack
detection when the model is trained for a binary classification
task. Five categories of subsidiary information are analyzed
using the meta data provided from the ASVspoof 2019 PA
dataset: ‘Room Size’, ‘Reverberation’, ‘Speaker-to-Mic dis-
tance’, ‘Attacker-to-Speaker distance’, and ‘Replay Device
Quality’.
The CAN framework is trained using a repetition of the
three phases shown in Figure 2. In the first phase, the param-
eters of the subsidiary model are frozen, and the encoder and
the primary model are trained. This procedure is equivalent to
the training of E2E DNN introduced in Section 2. In the sec-
ond phase, parameters of the encoder and the primary model
are frozen, and the subsidiary model is trained. If the loss de-
creases well in this process, it can be interpreted that the sub-
sidiary information actually exists in the current code, and if
the loss does not decreases well, it can be the first case which
explained in the previous paragraph (subsidiary information
does not reside in the code). In the third phase, parameters
of the primary model and the subsidiary model are frozen,
and the encoder is trained to exclude subsidiary information
by the adversarial process. Here, we remove the subsidiary
information by the encoder by training the code to be orthog-
onal from basis vectors of the subsidiary model, trained at the
previous phase. By repeating these three phases, CAN trains
the DNN to perform the primary task and exclude subsidiary
information.
Here, interpret the results of the CAN in three cases as
follows.
1. The encoder and the primary model is successfully
trained, but the subsidiary loss does not decrease while
the parameters of encoder is frozen: subsidiary infor-
mation does not reside in the code enough to conduct
subsidiary information classification when the DNN is
trained as a binary classifier.
2. The CAN framework is successfully trained, but the
performance of the replay detection decrease as sub-
sidiary information is excluded: subsidiary information
is helpful for conducting replay detection.
3. The CAN framework is successfully trained, and per-
formance is increased: subsidiary information is an ob-
stacle for replay attack detection.
3.2. Multi-task Learning Framework
The multi-task learning (MTL) framework was proposed by
Caruana et al. to train a DNN that can conduct more than
one task [19] simultaneously. In a number of studies, this
framework has successfully incorporated additional informa-
tion into the code by adding additional output layers. By
training with more than a single task, better generalization
performance has also been reported which is interpreted as a
result of the network not being overfitted to a single task. For
example, Chen et al. reported better performance in speaker
verification by explicitly training phoneme information with
the speaker information [20]. In replay attack detection, [21]
showed that the information regarding the subsidiary task
could be included in the code and improves the performance
on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset. However, [21] used a com-
bination of various categories of subsidiary information that
does not reveal the role of each category of subsidiary infor-
mation. In this study, we analyze the effect of adding each
category of subsidiary information via the MTL framework.
The MTL framework is trained using the following equa-
tion:
L = λpriLpri + λsubLsub, (2)
where L refers to the final loss, Lpri, Lsub refer to the cate-
gorical cross-entropy (CCE) loss, and λpri, λsub refer to their
weights respectively. Comparing to the CAN framework, the
MTL framework can be interpreted as training the encoder,
the primary, and the subsidiary model concurrently.
3.3. Modified MTL Framework for Replay Spoofing De-
tection
When the MTL framework is utilized in replay attack spoof-
ing detection for adding subsidiary information, overlaps can
occur between different tasks. Using ‘Replay Quality’ infor-
mation, for example, when bona-fide utterance is input, there
are no labels for the subsidiary task. In the authors’ previous
study, these confusions between the primary task and the sub-
sidiary task were further analyzed and a novel scheme was
proposed2.
In the modified scheme, there exists only one output
layer. The number of nodes of the output layer is equal to
the number of defined subsidiary task’s labels +1, where the
additional node is for bona-fide input. Through comparison
experiments conducted in the authors’ previous study using
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset [11], this scheme clearly outper-
formed that of the original MTL framework. Comparison
experiments of this scheme with the MTL framework on the
ASV2019 PA dataset are described in Table 4. Note that
2Referred to as authors’ work for now, but will cite papers after the
anonymity period ends
Table 2: Subset configuration of the ASVspoof 2019 physical
access dataset.
Subset # utterancesbona-fide spoof
Training 5,400 48,600
Development 5,400 24,300
Evaluation 18,090 119,367
because the used architecture is E2E, we use the value of the
bona-fide node directly as the score.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
All experiments of this paper were conducted using PyTorch
[32], a deep learning library in Python3.
4.1. Dataset
We used the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset for all experiments
[12]. Table 2 describes the subset configuration. This dataset
comprises 20 speakers (8 male, 12 female) and all utterances
are recorded at 16-kHz sampling rate with 16-bit resolution.
The training subset comprises 27 different acoustic configu-
rations in total which both bona-fide and replayed utterances
share: a combination of three ‘Room Size’, three ‘Reverber-
ation’, and three ‘Speaker-to-ASV Mic distance’. Nine dif-
ferent replay configurations are used which only replayed ut-
terances have: a combination of three ‘Attacker-to-talker dis-
tance’ and three ‘Replay Device Quality’. Note that the de-
velopment set is a closed set and the evaluation set is an open
set configuration (e.g. utterances in the development set will
share the level of ‘Reverberation’ with the train set, and the
unknown level of ‘Reverberation’ will be included in the eval-
uation set).
4.2. Acoustic Feature
Magnitude spectrograms with 2048 points fast Fourier trans-
form were used for all experiments in this study. The window
length and the shift size were 50 ms and 30 ms respectively,
following [27]. Normalization on mean or standard deviation
was not applied. In the training phase, 120 randomly selected
continuous frames were used for mini-batch construction. In
the test (inference) phase, entire frames were used.
4.3. Experimental Settings: Common for Baseline E2E
DNN, CAN and MTL
The encoder consists of nine residual blocks, a GRU layer,
and a code layer. The encoder is common to E2E DNN, CAN
3A Github link to the full experimental code will be released after the
anonymity period ends
and MTL. Each residual blocks have filter size of (3, 7) and
stride size of (2, 4) where inequality in the size was set con-
sidering the size of input spectrogram ((120, 1025) for train-
ing). The GRU layer has 512 nodes. The code layer is fully-
connected layer with 64 nodes. We used LReLU [29] for all
the non-linearity.
We used the AMSGrad [33] optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.0005. A weight decay with 0.0001 was applied to all
parameters. The size of the mini-batch is 32. For models with
Ring loss, the weights for the Ring loss and CCE loss are the
same.
For each epoch, we made the training set with all 5400
bona-fide utterances and randomly selected 5400 spoofing ut-
terances to balance the number of samples per each class.
In our internal comparison experiments, this method brought
performance improvement.
The primary model consists of only one output layer
(fully-connected, 2 nodes indicating bona-fide/spoof) with no
other hidden layers, for all E2E DNN, CAN, and MTL.
4.4. Experimental Settings: CAN
For experiments with the CAN framework, the subsidiary
model consists of two fully-connected hidden layers with 128
nodes, and an output layer with three nodes following [18].
The relative proportions of the first, second, and the third
phase, was set to 3:1:1, where the first refers to Figure 2-
(a), which train the encoder and the primary model (This is
identical to Baseline E2E training).
4.5. Experimental Settings: MTL
For experiments with the MTL framework, the subsidiary
model consists of an output layer that has three nodes follow-
ing [21]. The weight of the subsidiary loss (Lsub of Eq. 2)
was set to 0.5. When using replay-related subsidiary infor-
mation (‘Attacker-to-Talker’ and ‘Replay Quality’), we added
one node to the subsidiary model’s output layer for bona-fide
input.
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1. Removing subsidiary information (CAN)
Experiments conducted on all five categories showed identi-
cal results that the loss of subsidiary task did not decrease
while the encoder was frozen (The first case among the three
described in Section 3.1.). We interpreted this result as that
the subsidiary information does not naturally reside enough
in the code to conduct subsidiary information classification
when the DNN is trained using a binary classification scheme
(bona-fide/replayed). In other words, training a spoofing de-
tector using a simple binary classification scheme could not
utilize the subsidiary information. Based on this interpreta-
tion, the results in [21, 22] which have seen improvement in
Fig. 3: A typical example of the loss for removing a category
of subsidiary information when adopting the CAN frame-
work. Illustrated image is from the experiment removing ‘Re-
play Quality’. At the end of the first phase in CAN train-
ing, loss value is under 0.2. However, after freezing the en-
coder, loss for subsidiary task (classifying replay device qual-
ity here) does not decrease from approximately 1.2, similar to
random classification.
performance by multi-task learning means that adding sub-
sidiary information can enhance the discrimination power of
the code.
We omit the table for the performance of CAN framework
because we concluded that subsidiary information does not
reside in the code enough to conduct the classification of sub-
sidiary information, which the CAN framework aims to re-
move, making the EER meaningless. Note that for all five cat-
egories of subsidiary information, removing subsidiary infor-
mation with the CAN framework worsened the performances
in terms of EER of the primary task (replay attack detection).
Figure 3 depicts an example of losses when training CAN to
remove a category of subsidiary information from the code.
During the first phase (left part of the figure), the encoder and
the primary models are successfully trained. However, after
freezing the encoder, loss of the subsidiary model does not
decrease. In additional experiments where the encoder was
not frozen when training the subsidiary information, the loss
of the subsidiary task decreased successfully, but we did not
achieve improvements in terms of EER.
5.2. Adding subsidiary information (MTL)
Tables 3 and 4 describe the result of applying the MTL frame-
work and the modified MTL framework, respectively. The
performances on the development set (closed set configura-
Table 3: Results using the MTL framework on five categories of subsidiary information. Bold indicates the result better than
the baseline. Performance reported in EER (%).
Baseline E2E Room size Reverberation Spk-to-ASV mic Attacker-to-Talker Replay Quality
Val Eval Val Eval Val Eval Val Eval Val Eval Val Eval
w/o ring 1.26 4.79 1.41 6.66 1.30 4.65 1.14 5.00 1.08 5.40 1.46 4.63
w ring 1.31 4.53 1.09 5.25 0.91 4.51 1.04 4.65 1.31 5.27 1.22 4.85
Table 4: Additional experimental results of the modified
MTL introduced in Section 3.3. This scheme can be used
only for replay-related subsidiary information. Performance
reported in EER (%). For comparison with the ‘Baseline’,
refer to Table 3
Attacker-to-Talker Replay Quality
Val Eval Val Eval
w/o ring 1.13 6.20 1.99 4.80
w ring 0.91 7.03 2.11 5.46
tion) improved in all five categories of subsidiary information,
showing a relative error rate reduction (RER) greater than 30
% (‘Reverberation’ in Table 3, ‘Attacker-to-Talker’ in Table
4). However, in the evaluation set (open set configuration),
we gained a minor performance improvement of RER 3 % by
using ‘Reverberation’ and ‘Replay Quality’ only.
We analyze that the performance difference between the
development set and the evaluation set is mainly due to two
reasons. First, different configuration between the closed
set the and open set have brought performance differences.
Training and development set share common configurations
for each subsidiary information. However, although five
categories of subsidiary information is used, the evaluation
set comprises open set replay configurations. Second, in
each category of subsidiary information, the number of sub-
category labels are too small and ambiguous. For example,
for ‘Replay Quality’ of the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset, there
exists only three different kinds of labels, ‘perfect’, ‘high’,
and ‘low’. We conclude that three sub-categories, with rather
ambiguous labels are too small to generalize towards un-
known open set configurations. With this conclusion, suc-
cessful results using the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation dataset
(open set) with the MTL framework are analyzed to have
occurred owing to actual replay device labels.
The modified MTL framework also demonstrated per-
formance improvement only for the closed set configuration
(development set). In the results of this study, using the MTL
framework to add various subsidiary information did not
show significant improvement in the evaluation set. However,
significant improvement in the development set still demon-
strates that when detailed subsidiary information labels are
provided, adding these information can effectively improve
the performance of the replay attack detection, and by using
specifically labelled wide range of subsidiary labels, better
generalization on open set configurations can be expected.
Through experimental results, we concluded that various
categories of subsidiary information can effectively aid in
replay attack detection, but the process needs a wide range of
specific labels for each category of subsidiary information.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we analyzed what sort of information is needed
to conduct replay attack spoofing detection. For this purpose,
we employed an E2E DNN and analyzed what information
is included in the code embedding. Two frameworks, CAN
and MTL were utilized to either subtract or add certain cat-
egory of subsidiary information provided in the ASVspoof
2019 PA dataset to the code, respectively. Surprisingly, there
was not enough relevant information to train the subsidiary
model in the code extracted by the frozen encoder for all
five categories of subsidiary information when the encoder
has been trained using a binary classification scheme (bona-
fide/replayed). Through addition of various categories of sub-
sidiary information to the code, performance improvement
was measured in closed set configuration, showing an RER
over 30 % for ‘Reverberation’ and ‘Attacker-to-Talker’. We
interpreted the above two results as following: the simple bi-
nary classification scheme was not appropriate for utilizing
the subsidiary information which is helpful to replay spoofing
attack detection. However, in open set configuration, only mi-
nor performance improvements were observed. In our analy-
sis, the minor performance improvements in open set are due
to ambiguous, and small number of labels for each category
of subsidiary information. As our future work, we intend to
study different frameworks to include various categories of
subsidiary information to the code to further benefit from ad-
ditional information.
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